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Panel I
Discussion—Jus ad Bellum
On the Application of Force to al Qaeda and Taliban Members
Leslie Green
I do not believe that we have distinguished sufficiently between al Qaeda mem-
bers and Taliban members. Bear in mind that many of the volunteers from the
United Kingdom or from other countries who went to join the Taliban had no
desire to take part in al Qaeda terrorist activities. These volunteers were con-
cerned with spreading a fundamentalist type of Islam. They were proselytizing,
in many cases assisting Islamic colleagues in places such as Chechnya.
The Taliban may indeed not have been the government of the people of
Afghanistan. They were, however, the de facto authority in control of most
of the territory comprising Afghanistan. If this be the case though, once
al Qaeda has been dealt with, the issue of what are we doing in Afghanistan
must be raised. Otherwise, we might be supporting a government in frustrat-
ing a revolution or a civil war.
Finally, the word terrorism is used with too much abandon. This pejorative
has been too widely used and attributed to non-terrorist groups. Governments
have always argued that those trying to overthrow them are terrorists. His-
torically, governments have also taken the position that if the group was fight-
ing a government that was not liked, the group consisted of freedom fighters,
fighting for their liberation. Care should be taken to not become involved in
what are simply civil wars even when carried out by political ideologies that do
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not appeal to us. Such civil wars do not rise to the level of terrorist movements
simply because we do not like them.
Rein Müllerson
There are many governments which use the mantra of the Global War on Ter-
rorism to fight their opponents who may not be terrorists at all. This danger, of
course, always exists and can be seen today in both Russia and Central Asia.
Our task is to distinguish between those using terror tactics and those who are
not. It is true that in Afghanistan, and also in Chechnya and other places, reli-
gious fundamentalists have used terror tactics. So one has to make distinctions
between freedom fighters genuinely struggling for independence and common
terrorists. Though I believe in many cases, if not in most cases, terrorists are
independence fighters and independence fighters are terrorists too since they
use terror tactics in order to achieve their aims. There should not be any differ-
ence whether their aims are noble, lawful or not. If they use terror tactics, they
are terrorists.
Now about the distinctions between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Of course,
there are these distinctions. Al Qaeda is a worldwide net, and the Taliban was
an endogenous organization operating only in the territory of Afghanistan.
And the United States made these distinctions I believe. The United States
demanded that the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden and other leaders of
al Qaeda to it and that the Taliban dismantle the bases used by al Qaeda. The
Taliban did not comply with these requests and so the United States used
force in self-defense against both al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Perhaps a fine distinction between al Qaeda and the Taliban may be that
you could initially attack only al Qaeda and then based upon the reaction of
the Taliban, attack them as well. That is to say, if the Taliban come to the as-
sistance of al Qaeda then they too could be properly targeted. This seems to
me to be too formalistic, however, and international law does not require
making this distinction.
Robert Turner
When asked, “who was the government of Afghanistan on 11 September?,” I
would respond by querying whether Somalia had a government a decade ago. It
is clearly possible to have states that are so dysfunctional and so split that no au-
thority constitutes the legitimate government. The UN Security Council, act-
ing on behalf of the world community, has taken the position that the Taliban
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was not the government of Afghanistan, referring to it only as a faction.1 More-
over, the Security Council had ordered all states to immediately cease support-
ing terrorism, declaring such support a threat to the peace.2 Given that the
Security Council had de-legitimized any Taliban claim to act on behalf of the
government of Afghanistan, it is hard to argue the case that the Taliban was
the government of Afghanistan. In my view then, the Taliban was never the le-
gitimate government of Afghanistan. This of course does not necessarily mean
that a true, legitimate government actually existed within Afghanistan.
I am not of the same opinion as Michael Schmitt that the case for using
force against the Taliban would be easier to understand if the Taliban was the
legitimate government of Afghanistan. Subparagraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN
Charter protects states against intervention by other states.3 The Lotus case
tells us that international law is permissive.4 The UN Charter and the Kellogg
Briand Pact say states cannot use armed force in their political diplomatic re-
lations against each other to solve problems.5 States may use force to defend
themselves against attacks by other states.6 However, a large body of interna-
tional law on state responses to attacks by non-state entities such as terrorist
groups does not currently exist.
States are not guarantors of the security of their neighbors but they do have
a legal obligation to take reasonable steps to insure that their territory is not
used to launch armed attacks against other states.7 Having been placed on no-
tice that terrorist activity is originating from within their territory and thereaf-
ter demonstrating an unwillingness or inability to control such activity, a state
is deprived to some degree of its right against non-intervention by the ag-
grieved state. In this case, in the absence of other effective remedies, the ag-
grieved state may enter the host state for the express purpose of self-defense
against the terrorist threat. The aggrieved state may not generally attack the
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1. See generally S. C. Res. 1214, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1214/(1998), and S. C. Res.
1373, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
2. Id.
3. Article 2(4) specifically provides that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” U.N.
CHARTER, art. 2(4).
4. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1923), 2 Hudson, World Court Reports 20
(1929).
5. Kellogg Briand Pact, 27 Aug 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 U.N.T.S. 57.
6. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
7. Oscar Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1626 (1984); JOHN F. MURPHY, STATES SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM at 89 (1989).
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host state’s government or attempt to overthrow it. However, when that gov-
ernment is actively engaged in supporting the terrorist, then it too becomes a
lawful target. Under this rationale, the Taliban were clearly a legitimate target
of the United States, after September 11th.
A note of caution is appropriate though. The general principle that states
may not use armed force as a means of resolving differences with other states
in a non-defensive setting is thoroughly agreed upon and is tremendously im-
portant to uphold. Taking the position, as some do, that there is no interna-
tional law governing use of force is not only silly but it is harmful to the notion
of the rule of law that prohibits states from engaging in aggressive wars.
Michael Schmitt
Once the Taliban refused to comply with the demands of the United States, it
relinquished the exclusive right to act against al Qaeda. At that point, the
Taliban right to territorial integrity was subordinated to the right to self-de-
fense possessed by the United States. This type of distinction is of critical im-
portance because many states provide support to different rebel groups. This
difference needs to be maintained to prevent the argument that any state pro-
viding support to a rebel group in another state is engaging in an armed attack
thereby authorizing the state to invoke self-defense as a basis for action. The
US support of the Iraqi resistance is a great example of this. Clearly, the United
States does not want to be in a position where international law permits
Saddam Hussein to claim a right of self-defense against the United States sim-
ply because the Unites States is funding the acts of the Iraqi resistance.
Recognizing that the right to self-defense may only have applied initially
against al Qaeda, as soon as the Taliban interfered with the US exercise of
that right the Taliban properly became targetable as well. Such interference
would have been wrongful and would constitute an armed attack by the
Taliban, justifying the application of force against the Taliban by United
States and coalition forces. I remain somewhat surprised that US and UK
forces engaged the Taliban on the first day of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
instead of waiting until Taliban forces proved they were hostile to the exercise
of US self-defense. Certainly, had coalition forces waited until the demonstra-
tion of such hostility by the Taliban, their claim that their actions against the
Taliban were legitimate because they had been attacked and were exercising
the right of self-defense would ring truer.
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Wolff von Heinegg
I would caution against a rush to abolish recognized principles and rules of in-
ternational law just to serve certain purposes. So for example, if it is agreed the
Taliban is the de facto regime, the Taliban should be treated as such and the
protections of the Third Geneva Convention should be applied to Taliban
members.8
Christopher Greenwood
The Taliban cannot be considered anything other than the de facto govern-
ment of Afghanistan immediately before the use of force in October. They con-
trolled 80% of the territory of the country. They controlled virtually all the
levers of power within the state and all of the ordinary organs of government
from the central bank to the air traffic controllers. The border authorities were
taking their instructions from the Taliban. I know it was not the kind of govern-
ment the civilized world is used to. However, in functioning terms it was the
government of Afghanistan. And therefore its acts are imputable to Afghani-
stan. I agree with Professor Schmitt that this makes the actions of the coalition
easier rather than more difficult to justify. However, I do not believe that the
question of whether it is convenient to us or not that these people were the gov-
ernment of Afghanistan has any real bearing on the question of whether they
were in fact the government. It seems to me that we have become all too ready
to accept interpretations of the law on the basis of the convenient result which
they produce. As lawyers we should have the integrity to say this is what we
think the law is. If the consequences of that are inconvenient, let us look to see
what we can do about that. We should not, however, allow the wish to be father
to the thought.
Legitimacy of the Use of Force
Robert Turner
As is well established, there are two instances where force may be appropriately
used pursuant to the UN Charter: when authorized by the Security Council
and in different variations of self-defense.9 Interceptive self-defense or antici-
patory self-defense is the theory that force may be used in order to protect
against the prospective loss of lives caused by an armed attack. It is true
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8. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
9. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 42 and 51.
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historically, pre-UN Charter, that if a state was slaughtering its own citizens,
another state would have no legitimate basis for intervening as these were
purely matters internal to the affairs of the state. However, the growth of inter-
national humanitarian law subsequent to the Charter clearly recognizes that
individuals have internationally respected rights and that when a state does en-
gage in an act like genocide, it is not an internal matter. It is a matter of legiti-
mate global concern and international law should apply and prohibit such state
acts. To promote such international law, states must act as if it is their custom-
ary practice to recognize a limited right of the world community to intervene, to
stop massive slaughter of innocent people.
Wolff von Heinegg
There is no need to refer to humanitarian intervention as a legal justification
for the attacks on Afghanistan. There seems to be a general consensus that the
fight against terrorism justifies the action taken in and against Afghanistan and
probably in and against all other states similarly situated. Referring to humani-
tarian intervention as a basis for action against Afghanistan is counterproduc-
tive, lessening state credibility in the fight against international terrorism.
In looking at the action taken against Afghanistan, the strongest and best
legal justification is self-defense. If it is proved that the acts of September 11th
are attributable to the Taliban and thus to Afghanistan, every measure of self-
defense may be taken. This is a very important point as it addresses the tradi-
tional concept of self-defense and what we are today ready to acknowledge to
be within the competency of the Security Council. If the Security Council in
Resolution 1373 requires states to take very concrete measure against interna-
tional terrorism, every state is obliged to do just that. Such obligations are
conferred upon states by the Security Council for the purpose of peace and in-
ternational security. Benefiting from these measures is the entire international
community and not just the United States or Germany. So these obligations
laid down by the Security Council, for example in 1373, can be qualified obli-
gations. When a state does not comply with such resolutions, it violates its ob-
ligations towards the community of states as a whole. This violation, when it
constitutes a threat like permitting al Qaeda to continue operations in Af-
ghanistan, can then be acted upon by the affected community of states as a
whole. Clearly in a situation like this, there is no need to advocate humanitar-
ian intervention as the basis for such actions when the self-defense position is
so strong.
144
Panel I Discussion—Jus ad Bellum
E:\BLUE BOOK\VOL 79 TERROR\VENTURA FILES\VOL 79 BB TERROR 11_18_03.VP
Thursday, April 28, 2005 8:21:25 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Michael Schmitt
It is important that Security Council Resolution 1368 and 1373 not be inter-
preted as use of force authorizations, which they clearly were not. To do so
would seem to somehow imply that the Security Council needs to act before
the right of self-defense matures and can be exercised. The law of self-defense
provides all the answers necessary for determining whether the right to act ex-
ists for the United States as well as the international community. Security
Council Resolution 1373 is relevant on the issue of whether or not the Taliban
is in compliance with their obligations under international law to remove the
al Qaeda threat on the territory that it controls. The resolution though, was
not needed before the right to act in self-defense could be invoked by ag-
grieved states.
Christopher Greenwood
The self-defense case for the use of force by the Americans and their allies in
Afghanistan is an extremely powerful one and should not be watered down in
any way by trying to squeeze interpretations out of Security Council Resolu-
tions or referring to humanitarian law as the basis for intervention in Afghani-
stan. This is a classic example of how to undercut a strong case. Although I am
a supporter of humanitarian intervention, I do not believe that Afghanistan is a
particularly good example of this. Instead of straining to understand actions in
Afghanistan as for humanitarian purposes, we should instead stay focused on
the self-defense reasons for such actions.
If a neutral state allowed a belligerent to conduct military operations from
its territory or from its waters and refused to put a stop to that, then the receiv-
ing belligerent is entitled to take military action in the neutral’s territory to
put a stop to them. If the neutral state intervened to protect the belligerent it
had been sheltering, then it exposed its own armed forces to attack. In the
present case, this argument is particularly strong as the Taliban regime was
subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations beforehand for their sup-
port for al Qaeda. The Taliban made it crystal clear that they would resist vig-
orously any attempt by any part of the international community to deal with
the al Qaeda presence in their territory. This is an important point as we do
not want to give credence to a theory that as soon as any state has a group of
terrorists which have operated from its territory, it exposes itself to armed at-
tack. That very broad brush approach opens up the most horrific possibilities
because at some time or other virtually every state however hard it had tried
otherwise, had ended up with terrorists operating from its territory.
145
Panel I Discussion—Jus ad Bellum
E:\BLUE BOOK\VOL 79 TERROR\VENTURA FILES\VOL 79 BB TERROR 11_18_03.VP
Thursday, April 28, 2005 8:21:25 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
On Regime Change In Iraq
Robert Turner
Saddam Hussein’s non-nuclear options are the options that truly frighten me.
As we all know, Saddam Hussein is trying to obtain nuclear weapons and deliv-
ery systems. However, he is also playing with smallpox that is immune to known
cures as well as with the bubonic plague. Saddam does not stop there either; he
is playing with all sorts of biological systems that could be spread without leav-
ing fingerprints and that could cause a major loss of life around the world.
As long ago as October 1990 I advocated the intentional killing of Saddam
Hussein and I continue to feel that way.10 Attacking regime elites who threaten
international peace is clearly not “assassination” but is instead a legitimate act
of self-defense which the United States should avail itself of. The same argu-
ment can be made for targeting and eliminating Osama bin Laden.
The consequences of military action in the Middle East are frightening, as
there is the very real possibility that conflict with Iraq may spread and ignite
the entire region. However, the penalties for inaction are even greater. Time
is not on our side. The best way for the United States to deter Saddam and his
procurement of weapons of mass destruction is by presenting a united front
with the world community that demands the unfettered access of UN weap-
ons inspectors.
One viable justification for attacking Iraq might well be a request from Israel
for assistance under Article 51 given that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly ad-
mitted to not only encouraging people to engage in terrorism, but to providing
money to pay the families of people who commit suicide bombings. Clearly, so-
liciting such acts against the sovereign territory of Israel violates international
law and Israel and its allies are entitled to act in defense of Israeli citizens.
Moreover, given that the UN Security Council Resolutions of 1990 and
1991 remain valid, the conditions contained in them have not been met by
Saddam Hussein, and since Saddam Hussein continued to aggressively pursue
the development of weapons of mass destruction in violation of international
law, it seems clear that sufficient authority exists to effect a regime change in
Iraq. Saddam Hussein is acting aggressively, in violation of international law,
and I believe it is legal for the world community to use force against Iraq to stop
that threat. Furthermore, I also believe that it is legal to specifically use force
against Saddam Hussein as an individual if that is the best method available to
end the threat to world peace.
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10. Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would it be a Crime?., WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1990 at D1
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Michael Schmitt
There is a colorable argument that an international armed conflict currently
exists with Iraq and that the conflict is merely in a state of ceasefire. Given this,
to the extent that Iraq has in some form materially breached the ceasefire
agreement then recommencement of hostilities would be appropriate. This po-
sition certainly has merit.
Yoram Dinstein
Under the jus in bello, there is nothing inherently wrong in the targeting of en-
emy combatants. Enemy military personnel can be attacked either collectively
or individually. Saddam Hussein, being the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi
forces, is a legitimate military objective for attack by the United States.11 Obvi-
ously, such an attack—like all other attacks—has to be carried out by lawful
combatants on the American side, i.e., members of the armed forces wearing
uniform, carrying their arms openly, etc.
147
Panel I Discussion—Jus ad Bellum
11. See Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives under the Current Jus in Bello, in LEGAL
AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN (Andru Wall ed., 2003) (Vol. 78, US
Naval War College International Law Studies).
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